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DYNAMIC DECISIONS FOR THE COW-CALF PRODUCER
by Greg Hertzler
In the production and marketing decisions of a cow-calf producer
breeding herd investments and land acquisitions are primary. A static
model could assume either fixed or infinitely variable breeding herd and
land assets in the short-run or long-run respectively. Actually, the assets
of a producer are neither completely fixed nor Infinitely variable, but
must change over time.
The major purpose of this paper is to construct a dynamic theoretical
foundation upon which a model of the cow—calf production process could be
The key distinguishing features are the equations of motion specify
ing the changes over time of assets such as the breeding herd and land.
These equations of motion are either differential or difference equations
which constrain the adjustments cow-calf producers can make. As constraints,
they have dual variables giving the derived value of the assets at each
point in time.
A second purpose of this paper is to generalize the specification of a
cow—calf producer's objective function. It is customary to assume producers
maximize expected profits, or perhaps the utility of expected profits.
However, for many ranchers the lifestyle is most important and they may be
willing to pay for that lifestyle in profits foregone. Their objectives
will, of course, affect their behavior and also the beef and land markets.
A third and final purpose of this paper is to briefly discuss how the
basic theory could be expanded for use in empirical research and policy
making. Specifically, implications are drawn for setting the rental rate on
public grazing land, and indications are given of how uncertainty and expecta
tions could be included in aggregate models of the beef and land markets.
The Objective Function of a Cow-Calf Producer
Cow—calf producers who enjoy the amenities of ranching may have an.
objective such as
where
A is a discount factor embodying the producer's rate of time preference,
U is direct utility,
q is the amount of coimnodities consumed,
m is money assets in dollars,
b is the number of animals in the breeding herd,
1 is the animal units of land owned,
1' is the animal units of land rented,
w is the animal units of work by the rancher,
M is total wealth in dollars,
D is total debt in dollars,
T is the number of years in the producer's planning horizon,
t is a time subscript.
Cow-calf producers gain satisfaction from commodity consumption, q,
like any other consumer, but they may also enjoy owning and operating a ranch.
It is possible they feel more secure by saving. Hence, m, b, 1, 1*, and w
could all contribute to utility. If there is a bequest motive it might take
the specific form of leaving a particular ranch to particular heirs. How
ever, in Equation 1, the only consideration is the utility of bequeathing
net equity at time T-fl.
A convenient functional form for utility is
- - "tr, ^ 0^1 I f et- , ^ a2) ^-1
where
_ _ _ _ _»
q, m, b, 1, and 1 are minimum subsistence bundles,
w is maximum possible work, w^w being leisure,
e is a parameter such that 0 < £ < +<»,
and all other variables are as previously defined.
Equation 2 is a modified form of the Stone-Geary utility function which
is the basis of the linear expenditure system. The additive separability
of the Stone-Geary utility function limits the substitution possibilities
between its arguments. In spite of this empirical disadvantage, the linear
expenditure system gives very inituitive interpretations in a theoretical
discussion.
The usual form of the Stone-Geary utility function assumes a logarithmic
transformation. The modified form in Equation 2 is transformed by the
exponential parameter e. While demand functions are ordinal and invariant
to monotonic transformations, marginal utility of expenditures is not.
Transformations are important in discussing cardinal properties such as risk
preferences.
Equations of Motions
Four difference equations will be included to describe changes over
time in money, the breeding herd, land ownership, and debt.
Money
The change in money assets is savings or dissavings described as
3) + \ + - I^] +
where
u) is the tax rate on ordinary income,
Pjjj rate of return on assets the producer is willing to accept,
IT is profit from the production of offspring from the breeding herd,
p^ is the price per animal unit of work,
I is total interest on outstanding debt,
Y is the tax rate on capital gains,
B is the income from buying and selling breeding animals,
L is the diversion of money assets to land equity,
Pq is the price per unit of consumption commodity q,
and all other variables are as previously defined.
Notice capital gains taxes are not computed on land. This would be
the case if land is only accumulated and not sold.
Breeding herd
Investment in the breeding herd is an optimal replacement problem. One
approach is to choose the optimal replacement age of each animal in the
herd. However, determining the optimal age becomes very difficult because
the optimum for any animal depends upon every other animal in the herd.
%•
An alternative is to determine the number of replacement and culled
animals in each year. The optimal age before replacement is, in effect,
determined as some unknown function of replacement and culling decisions.
The change over time of the breeding herd becomes
''t+i - \ ^ s
where
r is the number of replacement animals,
c Is the number of culled animals excluding death loss,
S is the proportion of the breeding herd which dies unexpectedly.
Culling, at a minimum, includes all animals that failed to reproduce.
Land
The change over time of owned land is
where
a is the additional animal units of land acquired.
Debt
Producers could finance both cattle and land purchases through debt.
Because the dynamics of debt can become very complicated, breeding herd
expansions are assumed to be financed internally. Land can be financed
internally, or by long-term debt. Each loan is amortized over a given
repayment period at a fixed rate of interest. The fixed interest rate
assumption can be relaxed if necessary.
For a loan contracted at time t-T, the outstanding debt at various
times Is
''t-T,t-T" ''it-T ^®t-T ~ ®t-T '^
"^t-T+l.t-T ° ''t-T.t-T ~ '^ PTt-TPlt-T''\-T"\-T^ " Pnit-T''t-T,t-T '^
611I) '^ t-T+2.t-T ° ''t-T+l.t-T " '^'Tt-T^lt-T ^^t-T"®t-T^ ~Pmt-T''t-T+l.t-T^
't,t-T " ''t-l.t-T " ^^Tt-T^lt-T ^\-T"®t-T^ " ^mt-T'^ t-l.t-T^ "
where
^s,t-T ^ contracted at time t-T
is the price per animal unit of land,
a is the down payment in animal units of land,
p^ is the repayment factor defined below,
Y is the length of the repayment period.
Outstanding debt plus interest is repayed in T equal installments,
for a repayment factor of
^mt-T
7) Tt-T , , ,T •
From 6, the decrease in debt (increase in equity) for a loan is the
amount of the Installment payment minus interest on outstanding debt. A
more compact representation of the change in debt over time is possible by
substituting 6i into 6ii then subtracting 6ii from 6iii and combining terms,
and so on for all time periods, or
'^ t-T+l.t-T " ^t-T,t-T " "^^Tt-T "^mt-T^ ^It-T^^t-T " ^t-T^*
^^"^mt ^PTt-T Pmt-T^^lt-T^\-T ®t-T^ *
) *^t-T+2,t-T " ^t-T-l-l,t-T ^ ^^"^mt-T^ ^*^t-T+l,t-T ~ '^ t-T.t-T^
(l+p^t.^) Cp-p^._<j. "P^t-T^ ^It-T ^^t-T "^t-T^ •
6iv') ^t.t-T ^t-l,t-T " ^mt-T^^^t-l.t-T " '^ t-a.t-T^
~ ^mt-T^ ^^Tt-T ^mt-T^ ^It-T^^t-T ~ ^t-T^'
A new loan can be contracted in each time period, making total debt at
time t a function of all loans initiated between times t-T and t. Tl^ amount
of debt retired is the sum of the change in each individual debt.
-°t=X
T-1
=® - Z (1 + p (p - p )p (a — a )
s=0 mt-s ^Tt-s ^mt-s^lt-s t-s t-s
where
s is a time subscript.
Retired debt is not the same as the change in total debt which equals
^s=0 ^^t+l.t+l-s ~^t,t-s^ ° °t+r\ *^t+l.t+l.
• • •-
Other Functional Forms
It remains to specify functional forms for wealth, M, profit from pro
duction, n, interest expense, I, capital gains income from sale of the
breeding herd, B, and money converted to land equity, L. Tax rates on
ordinary and capital gains income, wand y respectively will be assumed
constant, although o) especially, is a function of income and depreciation.
Wealth
In dollar terms, total wealth of the cow—calf producer is
9) = ^ + + Plt\
where
p^ is a weighted average price over all breeding animals of different
ages.
Profit
As the primary source of income, the cow—calf producer's profit from
the sale of offspring is
10) "t = ^ ^ t- - PmtPbt^ - Pmt t>
- Pwt«t
where
p^ is the price per animal of offspring either sold or used as breeding
replacements,
F is the production function giving animals produced as a function of
animal unit inputs.
O is the time lag between breeding and sale,
is the price per animal unit of rental land.
The producer must pay rent on breeding animals, on both owned and
rented land, and must pay wages. Of course, returns to the breeding herd,
land, and wages are sources of income in Equation 3. Only rental land is an
out-of-pocket expense.
Production function F is difficult to adequately specify. Biological
growth models from resource economics where harvesting is imperfect and
population dynamics allow the breeding stock to expand into the environment
are of little use in beef production where harvesting is perfect and popula
tion dynamics are completely controlled. When land and work are limiting
factors, reproduction and growth may be less than maximum with some sub
stitutions possible between breeding animals, land, and work. However,
when the number of breeding animals is limiting and land and work exist in
sufficient quantities for proper reproduction and growth a biological plateau
may be reached where increasing land or work will not increase production.
On this plateau, calves produced will be proportional to the size of the
breeding herd.
One possible approach is to specify
where
V is the reproduction rate as a function of the breeding herd, land,
and work.
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The rate of reproduction can be considered constant when there is sufficient
or excess land and work for a given size herd. Otherwise, v is decreasing
»
in b, increasing in 1+1 , and increasing in w. Overall, F is concave but
not strictly concave.
Interest expense
Total interest paid on outstanding debt equals total monthly payments
minus that portion of the payments which go toward retiring debt (increasing
equity) or,
° S=0 +°t+l - °t-
because ~ increase in equity.
Capital gains
Gain from investing in the breeding herd is
13) = +^
where
X is the discounted marginal utility of expenditures,
$2 Is the rate at which the suitability for slaughter of a breeding
animal depreciates over time,
T is the age of the breeding animals being culled.
Current investment in replacement animals subtracts from current income,
Over time these invested animals will depreciate as slaughter animals while
the future income from their sale must be discounted to its present value by
the ratio of marginal utilities.
11
Land equity
Land equity acquired in any period is the amount of debt retired on
previous loans plus any current down payment,
U) - D^) +
Constraints on the Decision Process
Several feasibility constraints exist, but only those which are apt to
be binding are explicitly imposed. These are
15) m^ < m^ (liquidity)
16) (collateral)
17) f (replacement)
18) ^ f (culling)
19) < I'^ (land rental)
20) ® ^ (land acquired)
w w
where
3^ is the proportion of the breeding herd which fails to successfully
reproduce,
1* is the maximum animal units of land available for rent.
The liquidity constraint requires a nonnegative bank balance at all
times while the collateral constraint prevents further borrowing when equity
vanishes. The replacement constraint makes investment in the breeding herd
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irreversible, and culling is bounded below and above by the number of animals
that have failed to reproduce and the total breeding herd. Land rental must
be above a minimum level, but cannot exceed total rental land available.
Land acquisition is restricted to be non-negative because capital gains
taxes are not computed for land, and the down payment cannot exceed total
land purchased.
Optimality Conditions
The Lagrangian (not H^iltonian) for the cow-calf producer's decision
problem is
T
21) J = S {A U
t=0 ^ ^
+ XJ - I^) + + m^]
+ - "t+l +
+ Z (1 + - P„t-s^Plt-s^\-s - ^t-s^ - °t+l +V
s-0
+ + ^2rt + ^lat\ + "2at
\+l "t+1
where
8 is the value of holding breeding animals for future production,
0 is the value of holding land for future production.
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4* is the value of holding debt for the future,
U*s are Lagrange multipliers.
The state variables associated with the equations of motion in Lagrangian
J are m, b, 1, and D. These state variables have corresponding costate
variables X, 0, 0, and ip. The variables available to control the system
are q, r, c, 1*, a, a, and w. Because of assumptions about functions U and
F, J is continuous and concave in m, b, 1, q, 1', and w, but is linear in
D, r, c, a, and a. Taking derivatives,
A. eU a
22) ^ » 0 = + X. (l-co)p ^-X .+X + y +Ur»>
am ^ Z ^ t-1 t %t ^t
t
-.IN - n , , ,1 - N
24)
- + (1-3^)6 ^ + V2ct
3J _ 0 . , , ,, , ,n;-°' 7-7^ + ^ ^-a
't-1 +
T25) If =0=a,(X^_^ - X^) -
•>T A^eU a
27) = 0 - -Xjl-Y)p^^ + 0^ +
28) If- =0=X^(1-Y)62\^ - e, +Ui,, - U2,,.
. A £U a , 3v
° ° ° ^ \(i-")(P,t ST \-a -31 t \ - \ t
+ - ^21't.
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SJ30) |^=o =-(3.a5i^^p^^ '
t s=0
- (pTt-Pmt^Plt ft+s +
8®U
31) If =0=(l-<o)p,^p^^ V - X
t s=0
s
+ (PTt-p^t^Plt ^ Cl+P^t> '^ t+s + ^lat-^2at'
s«0
~T -A^eU a 9v^
32) 1;^ = 0 " + X(l-a3)p :r-- b
^
Terminal conditions are
9J « ^ * ^"t+1
T T4-1 •
3J
^^T+1 " ^ " " ®T VbT+1'
9U
^^T+1 " ° " ~^T "*" ^+1 ^lT+1 '^ T ^ ^x'^ lT+l*
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aj ^"t+1
^^T+l " ° " \+l 3M^ ~"'^ T ~
The above first order conditions are a generalization of the usual
separation of consumption from production decisions. If =
a,, = ct =0 and money is constant with m = m^, the above first order
1 w t+1 t
conditions collapse to those obtained by maximizing the utility of consumption
subject to a budget constraint and separately maximizing the utility of
net income (which equals expenditures) subject to equations of motion and other
constraints. For example, the discounted marginal utility of expenditures
is X = A (9U/8E ) which can be substituted into condition 22 to obtain
W t t
3J/9m^ = A^OUj./3E^) (l-(jj)p^^ + when = 0 "^t+1 ^t*
same condition is derived from maximizing A^U(E^) subject to constraints.
If a further restriction is imposed requiring marginal utility of expenditures
to be constant (i.e., there is risk neutrality) the above first order con
ditions collapse to those obtained by maximizing the present value of net
income.
Demand for Consumption and Amenities
The first step in specifying the demand system is determining rela
tionships for the costates 6 and 0. Equating 27 and 28,
Because the left-hand side of 37 is always positive, one or both of
and must be positive, with either or both r and c at their respective
lower bounds. It would be possible, in some cases, for r to be at its lower
bound and c at its upper bound if the outlook for the beef market is so grim
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or cash flow such a problem the only alternative is to completely liquidate
the herd. In a more normal circumstance* c would be at its lower bound and
r at an interior solution. Then, in 27, the discounted value of holding
stock for future production, 9, would equal the discounted current after
tax value of a replacement animal.
The value of holding land is found by adding 30 to 31,
38) 0^ =
At an interior solution, the discounted value of holding land for the future
equals the discounted current value of land. If land acquisition is con
strained to be non-negative with positive, the value of holding land
can be less than the current value.
First order conditions 26, 22, 23, 24, 29, and 32 are the demand system
for consumption and amenities. The value of holding stock from 27 is sub
stituted into 23, and the value of holding land from 38 is substituted into
24. Each of the first order conditions is then solved for its corresponding
Ot,
"q °
X
40) a P (m - i ),
m mt t t
X
"b = - V-
t t
t t
17 .
"i- -
«w = r5u: - V-
tl U
where
p Is as before, and
qt
X
01V =^ ^ "\ '
3v X46) 0< +3^ ^^ <l-Y>Prt-l
C"H3 t
V-i I'll
- a-e,) (i-Y)P„ - ^ + (i-B^) X
. l^lct „ ^*201
" Pfat ®3 " T^'
47) 0< =- (l-<.)p^^ ^
^lat-1 , ^lat
„ _ ., , , , ^ll't , ^2Vt48) 0<P^,^ =- (l-^)(p^^ ^ - P„,Pi.,) - — +-^.
49) 0<P^^ =(l-u,)p^^ 3-^
t
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If any a (excluding a^) is zero the corresponding amount paid in
profits foregone, P, must be zero. As long as cow-calf producers can meet
liquidity, collateral, and other constraints, they can consume amenities and
accept less than profit maximizing returns to their assets and labor.
Normally, cardinality can be purged from a demand system such as 39-44
by noting ^ "P equations and solv
ing for discounted marginal utility as
a ct ^m a, ^b ct, *^1 *^1' a %
AEU <P^> ^^ *^qt mt ^bt ^It ^l*t V50) X = — = 1—ill
' (^t-V
where
51) \-\=
+ P
which are expenditures above subsistence. Then each of the a's becomes a
function of expenditures on a single good divided by expenditures on all goods
Upon rearranging. Equations 39-44 would become a demand system.
Unfortunately, P , P^, P,, and P., still depend upon cardinal dis-
m b 1 i
counted marginal utility, X, especially if a constraint is binding. Only
P is directly observable from known technologies, with producers paying for
w
leisure whenever more work would increase production. Unless all other P*s
are known, the demand system cannot be estimated.
19
Observing Payments for Amenities
The keys to identifying the amounts paid for amenities are 1) decide
what constraints are binding, and 2) make some assumption which allows the
ratio of discounted marginal utilities, to be observed as a function
of known parameters. Only two constraints will be important in many situa
tions, the lower bound on culling with positive, and perhaps the upper
bound on rental land available with V21't ^ assumption about
the a's will allow the ratio of marginal utilities to be observed.
First suppose the only nonzero Lagrange multiplier is U-, • Also
let
suppose money does not contribute to utility, i.e., there is no "saving for
a rainy day," making a = P =0. Then relationship 37 determines p- and
m m let
can be solved from 45 to give
\-l45') 0 - P = - (1 + (l-w)p^J
m mt
t+cr
3V
47') 0 < = - a-u))p^^ gj- + (1 + - Pit'
3v
48') 0 < = - (l-cXp^t - PmtPl't)-
Relation 48* holds only when the rental rate of rented land is set
sufficiently high to ensure an interior solution. For some ranchers renting
20
public lands, this may or may not be the case. If there is excess demand
for rented land, will be positive and 48 becomes unobservable.
Suppose it is possible to assume a rancher is willing to pay equally
for either rented or owned land. This is an extremely strong assumption, but
allows to be substituted for in the estimation process without involv
ing relationship 48.
If any other constraints are binding, further restrictions will,
regrettably, be necessary. Once estimation of the ordinal demand system is
done, measurement of the cardinal parameter A is possible by an experiment
to determine risk preferences. In a model with certainty, a nwre correct
term would be variation preferences, but the term risk preferences will be
used in anticipation of generalizing the model to the uncertain case. Risk
preferences are measured by
3lnA E
E^-E^
where
p is the expenditure elasticity of the discounted marginal utility of
expenditures.
Elasticity p is also known as the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of relative
risk aversion. Once it is found by experimental elictation, e is known.
Producers have risk aversion, neutrality, or affinity if p > 0 and 0 < £ < 1,
p * 0 and e = 1, p < 0 and e > 1 respectively. If e were fixed with p and
E allowed to vary, producers would display decreasing relative risk aversion
as expenditures increased above subsistence.
21
Risk preferences are especially important at corner solutions where a
positive Lagrange mutliplier is divided by X. In 50» more risk averse
producers will have a smaller X, compounding the effect of a binding con
straint. Risk preferences also play a role in determining interest rates.
If discounting is exponential with A^. = 1/(1 + 6) * then 50 substituted into
45* yields
U_ E -1
53) 0 = (l+a)(-^)( ) - (1 + (I-U)P^^).
where
6 is the rate of time preference.
The classic result holding the after tax interest rate to equal the rate of
time preference requires a steady-state with constant U and E under the
maintained assumption ct^ —0. Instability allows risk preferences to affect
the interest rate because e is a parameter of U.
Implications for Public Land Policy
When there is excess demand for renting public land with ^21*^ > 0
and other multipliers zero, and assuming = 0 and equated
to 48 provides the relationship
54) ^ +^ It-l '
If the price of private land was constant, ~ ^It' rate of
return on private land, p > exceeds the rental rate on public land,
mt J.t—i
^mt^l't' point where excess demand vanishes, U21't " ^
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P Pi 1 = P Pnf for constant land prices. When the price of private land'^mt lt-1 '^mt I't r r
has been increasing, the rate of return on owned land exceeds the rental rate
on public land, even when excess demand vanishes. This is because the
value to the producer of holding land for the future has increased. Of
course the opposite is true when land prices have been declining.
A policy maker wishing to have all public lands rented, but also wishing
to set the rental rate as high as possible cannot necessarily equate the
rental rate on public land to the rate of return on private land, even if
producers are willing to pay equally for either private or public land.
Rental rates on public land should be determined by changes in land values.
If producers were willing to pay less for public than private land, the
rental rate would be reduced by an unknown amount.
Uncertainty in Cow-Calf Producer Decisions
The introduction of uncertainty and expectations of the future into
producer decisions is difficult and tedious. This paper will present only a
basic introduction to the features which distinguish expectations in a
dynamic optimization model from previous expectations mechanisms as they have
been applied to essentially static models. The interested reader is referred
to Hertzler, 1982.
The difference between expectations based on dynamic decision making and
ad hoc expectations can be introduced by an analogy. Producers following
an extrapolative expectation scheme and preparing for the future are assumed
to be looking backward to the past, and taking a step backwards into the
23
future. Producers who are planning optimally, take the past and present as
given, look to the future, and step forward.
The key variables in forming expectations of the future are the costates
Using terminal condition 34 and the relationship for the change over time of
the value of holding breeding stock in 23, the value of holding stock, 9 at
time t can be solved backward from time T as a function of future variables.
Upon recursive substitution,
S't+1 b - b
s s
3v .
bs
^ X ^bs X ^3 ^ X
8 8 S
The value of holding land, 0, can be solved from terminal condition 35
and recursive relationship 24, or
T
56) 0 =XP + Z [ ^
^ ^ J-i+i 8«j.+l 1 -1
S S
9v p
+ X((l-a))p^^ ^ b „ +
s rs o- s~0 A is
Is s
The value of holding debt from 36 and 25 becomes
59) - -X^ +a,X^ - I
s*t+l
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A producer at time t wishing to maximize Lagrangian J in 21, but
faced with uncertainty about the future must take the expectation of J
conditioned upon currently available information. If all current variables
are adequately observed, the first order conditions for time t involve
expectations only of the coatates, 6, 0, and and also of future discounted
marginal utilities, A.
Demand relationship 41 can be rearranged to yield ~
Assuming the only positive Lagrange multiplier in 55 is P^ct
mined by 37, then P, from 46 converts the value of holding stock«@, in 55
b
into an alternate specification
55') 0^ = (1 -0^) ^T^bT+l
+ I X^((l +(l-^)P,3>^^-^>Prs-l -
a=t+l
Expectations of the value of holding stock involve uncertain future
interest rates, prices for investment animals, and discounted marginal utilities
of expenditures. Discounted marginal utility of expenditures, X, is itself
a costate variable defined by terminal condition 33 and relationship 22.
The value of holding land also has an alternate specification found by
applying 42 and 47 to 56
56') 0^ = K + (1-03)P„3)p,3., - Pi,).
S«t+1
At an interior solution, the value of holding land depends upon uncertain
25
future interest rates and land prices, and uncertain future discounted
marginal utilities of expenditures.
Summary
A dynamic theoretical model of the cow-calf producer's decision problem
was presented using a utility function to specify producer's objectives.
A practical method for measuring the amenities of a lifestyle was proposed.
Implications for public land policy were drawn, and suggestions for including
uncertainty given.
Further extensions of the model might include aggregation of the single
producer model into capital, beef, and land s^rkets by including price equa
tions for interest rates, beef and land prices. The model could be altered
to allow estimation of behavioral relationships for breeding herd investment
and culling and land acquisition by the inclusion of adjustment costs.
Dynamic phenomena such as long-run instability in the beef market could then
be examined.
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